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We report a laboratory experiment on strategic manipulation in positional rules, by which indi-
viduals are asked to elicit a complete ranking over 3 alternatives. The prominent rule in this set is 
the so-called Borda Count, but our experiment also considers other rules in which we increase the 
score associated to the second-best candidate and vary the monetary prizes in case of a victory of 
the latter (“preference intensity”). Our results suggest that, as standard game-theoretic logic would 
suggest, when the intermediate scores and prizes increase, strategic manipulation is reduced. We 
also see that group size affects the likelihood of strategic manipulation in a non-linear fashion, and 
mostly depends on how the intermediate score is manipulated. Furthermore, rule efficiency in-
creases with group size (i.e., as the probability of being pivotal decreases) and with both the in-
termediate scores and prizes. 
 
Keywords 




Strategy proofness, or non-manipulability, is a very desirable property for a voting mechanism, as it requires that 
no individual gets a benefit from misrepresenting her “true” preferences. We know from Gibbard [1] and Sat-
terth Waite [2] that there is no voting mechanism—other than the dictatorial one—that is strategy-proof when 
voters are allowed to submit any ranking of candidates and every candidate has the chance to be elected at least 
once. Notwithstanding, the extent of manipulability for specific voting rules is essentially an empirical matter. 
By the same token, it should also be checked empirically if (and how) strategic manipulation affects the alloca-
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tion efficiency induced by the voting rule. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this literature by designing and conducting an experiment on a popu-
lar family of voting rules, called positional, which are used to select one out of multiple (i.e., more than two) al-
ternatives. A positional rule requires voters to assign decreasing scores from the best to the worst alternative. 
The alternative collecting the highest cumulative score wins the contest, with ties resolved by a random draw. 
The possibilities of strategic manipulation have been studied both theoretically (Ludwin [3], Kube and Puppe 
[4]) and experimentally. The experimental papers closest to ours are those of Forsythe et al. [5] and Bassi [6], 
who focus on the comparison among Borda Count, plurality voting and approval voting rules. In our experiment, 
a voting committee of a variable size (2, 4, or 8 voters, respectively) has to select one out of three alternatives, A, 
B, or C. The committee’s individual preferences are equally split into two alternative profiles: half of the voters 
prefers A to B, and half of the voters prefers B to A, while C corresponds to the worst option for everybody. In 
all voting rounds, subjects are asked to submit a full ranking over the three available options. In our experiment 
that consists of four treatments, we study how strategic manipulation is affected by i) grour size; ii) the interme-
diate score (i.e., the score associated with the second option in the ranking) and, most importantly; by iii) the 
monetary prize voters get when the second most preferred candidate wins (this is what we label as “preference 
intensity”). By the first treatment condition, we are able to compare, with the same game-form, Borda-type me-
chanisms with a voting scheme closer to anti-plurality voting. By the latter condition, we manipulate the incen-
tives for strategic manipulation. As we explain in Appendix A, standard game-theoretic reasoning predicts a re-
duction in strategic voting as the intermediate score and prize increase (as the opportunity costs of sincere voting 
are reduced). However, the effect (and direction) of an increase in the group size in subjects’ willingness to vote 
strategically is uncertain, besides the simple observation that, as group size grows, the likelihood of being pivot-
al decreases, which, in turn, may reduce the incentive for strategic manipulation (Duffy and Tavits [7])1. 
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental environment, while 
Section 3 summarizes our main findings. Here we report that strategic manipulation varies across treatments 
according with standard game-theoretic reasoning, as we just defined. We also detect (see Section 3.4) that effi-
ciency (measured by the relative frequency of outcomes in which the last-best outcome C does not win the con-
test) is increasing with both group size and the intermediate score, alongside what common sense would also 
predict for sincere voting (as strategic voting, even more when the intermediate prize is high, increases the like-
lihood of option C winning the election). By contrast, we also see that size effects are comparatively low, and 
also vary with preference intensity, decreasing (increasing) strategic manipulation when the value of the inter-
mediate prize is low (high), respectively. Finally, Section 4 concludes, followed by Appendices reporting a stan-
dard game-theoretic analysis of our game-forms and the experimental instructions. 
2. Design 
2.1. Sessions 
We run 5 sessions at the Laboratory of Theoretical and Experimental Economics (LaTEx), of the Universidad de 
Alicante. A total of 120 students (24 per session) were recruited among the undergraduate population of the Un-
iversidad de Alicante. The experimental sessions were computerized. Instructions were provided by a self-paced, 
interactive computer program that introduced and described the experiment; subjects were also provided with a 
written copy of the instructions2. 
2.2. Game-Form 
The experimental protocol mimics voting of small committees of 2, 4 or 8 players. Players have to rank, simul-
taneously and independently, a set of three alternatives A, B and C. The protocol assigns 1 (α) [0] points to the 
best (intermediate) [worst] alternative, respectively. The score of the intermediate option, ( )0,1α ∈  defines a 
 
 
1Notice that we cannot directly apply group size effects in the same way as in the literature on Cournot games(Selten [8], Huck et al. [9]), 
where, as the numbers of firm increases, the underlying equilibrium structure moves in the direction of increasing competition (and 
increasing instability of collusive behavior). In the context of positional voting, the (anti)coordination structure we identify in Appendix A 
in the case of 2 players, basically carries through for larger group sizes, with the basic difference that coordination is made more difficult as 
it involves a larger number of players. 
2The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher [10]). 
E. Mata-Pérez et al. 
 
 729 
positional mechanism, ranging from plurality rule (α = 0); Borda count (α =1 /2); to anti-plurality voting (α = 1). 
The sum of scores over all players is computed for each alternative, and the alternative receiving the largest 
amount of points wins the voting game. In case of a tie between two or three candidates for the highest score, the 
winner is determined through a uniform random draw.  
Preferences for a candidate are artificially induced by different monetary prizes; 1 (x) [0] points to the first 
(second) [third] best alternative. The monetary payoff associated with the second best, ( )0,1α ∈ , ( )0,1x∈  is 
our second treatment variable, which we label as preference intensity. 
Appendix A reports a standard game-theoretic analysis of our experimental treatments, by evaluating all Nash 
equilibria that survive the iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies of the 2-player versions of our voting 
protocol, as a function of our parameter pair, ( ) ( )2, 0,1xα ∈  There we see that 1) symmetric sincere voting is 
never an equilibrium; 2) strategic voting (i.e., placing the worst candidate second) belongs to the support of all 
equilibria and corresponds to the unique symmetric equilibrium when α < 1/2; and 3) when α and x grows, 
individual incentives for strategic manipulation are reduced, in that the game is strategically equivalent to an an-
ti-coordination game whose equilibria require one player playing sincerely, while the other playing strategical-
ly3. 
2.3. Treatments 
A realization of the pair (α, x) defines a (between-subject) experimental treatment. We run five sessions under 
four different treatments, TR1 to TR4 (two sessions in case of TR2), parametrized as follows: TR1 = (0.5, 0.25), 
TR2 = (0.5, 0.5), TR3 = (0.5, 0.75), TR4 = (0.75, 0.5). In words: α = 0.5 corresponds to the Borda Count, where 
α = 0.75 approaches anti-plurality voting (which corresponds to α = 1, i.e., discarding the least preferred 
option). 
2.4. Matching 
In each session, subjects are randomly divided into 3 matching groups (cohorts) of 8, with subjects from differ-
ent cohorts never interacting with each other throughout the session. In each session, subjects play 40 rounds of 
one treatment of the voting game. Within each round t = 1, ..., 40, group size within a cohort is randomly de- 
termined. Let perio ( ){ }3 1 3 , 1, ,13kT k t k k= − < ≤ =    be the subsequence of the kth 3 rounds. Within each  
period kT  subjects experience each possible group size { }2, 4, 8n∈  with the sequence being different for 
each cohort, to keep under control the time distance between two rounds characterized by the same value of n. 
As for preference distribution, exactly half of the subjects receives the highest prize if either A or B wins, while 
a victory of C is associated with a zero payoff for all. Given this design feature, in what follows we shall define 
the type of a player, A or B, depending on the identity of her preferred option. The same preferences distribution 
is maintained in all groups and for all sizes. Player type, A or B, is fixed during all the session. This specific 
matching protocol is publicly announced at the beginning of the experiment. 
2.5. Financial Rewards 
All monetary payoff in the experiment are expressed in Spanish pesetas (€1 is about 166 pesetas). Subjects re-
ceive 1000 pesetas just to show up, to which they sum up all their cumulative earnings throughout the 40 rounds 
of the experiment. As for payment, the payoff parametrization of Section 2.2 is multiplied by 100. Average 
earnings in the experiment were about € 12, for experimental sessions lasting for approximately 45 minutes. 
3. Results 
3.1. Aggregate Play 
Table 1 reports average frequency of strategy use across treatments. 
As Table 1 shows, frequencies of sincere and strategic votes are much higher than those of all other strategies 
combined, which, in what follows, will be considered as a “residual strategy”. We also notice that strategy 
ma-nipulation is the highest in Borda Count, especially in TR1 and TR2, when the intermediate prize is compara 
3This is exactly the reason whywe did not run sessions with α < 0.5. As we explain in Appendix A, this is the case in which strategic voting 
dominates all other strategies and the game becomes trivial. 
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            Table 1. Average frequency of strategy use disaggregated for treatments.                  
TR SINC STRAT OTHER 
1 177 745 38 
% 18.44 77.60 3.96 
2 468 1,337 115 
% 24.83 69.64 5.99 
3 330 545 85 
% 34.38 56.77 8.85 
4 324 560 76 
% 33.75 58.33 7.92 
Total 1299 3187 314 
% 27.06 66.40 6.54 
 
tively low. This is perfectly in line with the game-strategic analysis reported in Appendix A.  
Figure 1 tracks the evolution of strategic behavior across periods. 
As Figure 1 shows, strategic manipulation grows with time, this effect being stronger in the Borda Count 
treatments (TR1 to TR3), and within this set, the lower is the intermediate prize (i.e., TR1 through TR3, when 
the opportunity cost of manipulating is lower, see Appendix A). These results are in line with the finding of 
Bassi (2014), who detects higher manipulation in the case of the Borda Count with respect to approval voting 
(the rule which is closer to our “high intermediate prize”, T4). In this respect, Figure 1 also shows that, when 
strategic conditions are more favorable (above all, in TR1 and TR2), we detect a strong learning effect in favor 
of strategic manipulation. 
3.2. Individual Behavior 
In light of the aggregate data presented in Section 3.1, Table 2 shows the estimates of a panel data logit regres-
sion (with random individual effects) where the dependents variables, STRAT, SINC and OTHER, are binary va-
riables indicating whether an individual voted sincerely, strategically or chose an action different from strategic 
or sincere, respectively. We include in the set of regressors our treatment variables, α and x, together with the 
group size and the voting round. Except for the latter, all regressors are dummies (i.e., we allow for non-linear 
relations between our regressors and the dependent variables). 
As Table 2 shows, strategic voting increases (decreases) with time (α and x), respectively. As for the latter, 
this result is consistent with the theoretical analysis of Appendix A, in that subjects’ likelihood to play strategi-
cally seems aligned to a great extent with the strategic incentives by which strategic manipulation pays off. We 
also see that this tendency gets stronger as time proceeds.  
The “size effect” deserves a separate discussion. As Table 2 shows, moving from 2 to 4 players boosts stra-
tegic manipulation significantly—this in contrast with the commonsense argument we proposed in the introduc-
tion. By contrast, moving from 4 to 8 has the opposite effect, so that the 8-player dummy is no longer signifi-
cant4. 
This (somewhat puzzling) result requires further investigation. To this aim, Figure 2 shows the “box plots” 
representing the distribution of subjects’ relative frequencies of strategic behavior across the four treatment con-
ditions, disaggregated for group size5. 
As Figure 2 shows, strategic behavior has a more pronounced positive (negative) trend in T3 (T2), respec-
tively, although seems negligible in all four treatment conditions. This preliminary conclusion is reinforced by 
looking the estimates of Table 3, where we estimate the probability of strategic play is estimated by way of a 
random-effect logit regression for each (between-subject) treatment, maintaining group size and period as com-
mon regressors.  
The estimates of Table 3 show that group effects strongly depend on preference intensity, in that the lower is  
 
 
4The point estimate for the difference between group size 4 and 8 reveals that the change in voting behavior when group size increases from 
4 to 8 is not significant (p-value = 0.393). 
5The boxes show 50% of the total observations (from the 25% to the 75% percentile). Adjacent lines trace the first upper and lower adjacent 
values, while points denote outliers. The line within the box denotes the median. The solid lines connect the means of the two distributions. 




Figure 1. Evolution of aggregate behavior disaggregated for treatment and group size.                                 
 
 
Figure 2. Distributions of strategic play (averaged across subjects), disaggre- 
gated for treatment and group size.                                     
 
x—theoretically, the best condition for strategic manipulation—the higher is the tendency of subjects to play 
sincerely when group size increases. By contrast, no group significant group effect emerges when x = 0.5, where 
the case of x = 0.75 is characterized by a significant increase—specifically, moving from n = 2 to n = 4—of 
strategic manipulation. 
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            Table 2. Logit regressions.                                                     
DEP. VARS. SINC STRAT OTHER 
period −0.0305*** 0.0374*** −0.0356*** 
 (0.00769) (0.00786) (0.00835) 
size_4 −0.207*** 0.168** 0.0800 
 (0.0714) (0.0742) (0.182) 
size_8 −0.136 0.0989 0.0966 
 (0.112) (0.103) (0.220) 
alpha 0.0188*** −0.0206*** 0.0121 
 (0.00661) (0.00720) (0.0137) 
x_25 −0.362** 0.428** −0.439 
 (0.161) (0.168) (0.281) 
x_75 0.498*** −0.582*** 0.427 
 (0.161) (0.180) (0.351) 
constant −1.367*** 1.042** −2.762*** 
 (0.454) (0.483) (0.915) 
observations 4800 4800 4800 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at cohort level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
            Table 3. Logit regressions.                                                     
 TR1 TR2 TR3 TR4 
 α = 0.5 α = 0.5 α = 0.5 α = 0.75 
DEP. VARS. x = 0.25 x = 0.5 x = 0.75 x = 0.5 
period 0.0690** 0.0488*** 0.0261*** 0.0114 
 (0.0288) (0.0127) (0.00949) (0.00978) 
size_4 −0.150*** 0.0210 0.495*** 0.274 
 (0.0357) (0.0623) (0.0306) (0.184) 
size_8 −0.393 0.0840 0.512** 0.0219 
 (0.305) (0.0922) (0.233) (0.160) 
constant 0.183 −0.143 −0.582*** 0.00870 
 (0.362) (0.198) (0.172) (0.112) 
observations 960 1,920 960 960 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at cohort level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
3.3. Efficiency 
Lehtinen [11] claims, by way of numerical simulations, that strategic voting in the case of positional voting me-
chanisms is welfare increasing and that it is less welfare increasing when the second-placed utilities for the 
second-best candidates are midway between the best and the worst, i.e. intensity of preferences matter. 
In the specific parametrization we use, with an equal split between type A and type B players, and uniform 
payoff across types (see Appendix A), a natural measure for ex-post efficiency can be considered as the relative 
likelihood of the worst available option, C, winning the contest6. To this aim, for each voting game, we define a 
variable, EFF index, which takes the value of 1 if A or B win (or tie), 2/3 if there is a tie between all candidates, 
1/2 if C wins with either A or B, and 0 if C wins alone. 
Figure 3 tracks the evolution of our efficiency index, disaggregated for treatment and group size. As Figure 3 
shows, efficiency seems to decrease with time (i.e., when strategic behavior increases), especially when n = 2. 
On the other hand, group size seems to have a significant impact on efficiency: although it does not seem to di-
rectly impact the overall rate of sincere play, it seem crucial in avoiding the coordination failure associated with 
strategic play, i.e., the associated likelihood for the last-best to be selected.  
By analogy with previous analysis, in Table 4 we estimate a (random-effect) ordered log it by which our effi- 
 
 
6See Appendix B. 




Figure 3. Evolution of EFFindex, disaggregated for treatment and group size.                            
 
Table 4. Orderedlogit regressions of EFF index. Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
clustered at cohort level.                                                                  
DATASET ALL BORDA  
period −0.0356*** −0.0496***  
 (0.0116) (0.0136)  
size_4 0.618*** 0.644***  
 (0.132) (0.126)  
size_8 1.613*** 1.906***  
 (0.286) (0.298)  
Alpha 0.0213*** N/A  
 (0.00659)   
x_25 −0.537*** −0.626***  
 (0.153) (0.170)  
x_75 0.960*** 1.066***  
 (0.184) (0.206)  
observations 4800 3840  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at cohort level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
ciency index is regressed against our common set of explanatory variables. 
Table 4 reports two regressions, one using the entire dataset, the other only considering the evidence for the 
Borda Count (i.e., excluding TR4). The estimations of Table 4 confirm that efficiency falls with time, and grows 
with α x and n. In other words, 1) Lehtinen’s (2007) is not supported by our data, while 2) our commonsense 
conjecture, although does not seem to hold when looking at individual behavior, works with efficiency: as the 
group goes large, the likelihood of inefficient outcomes falls. 
4. Conclusion 
Paraphrasing Jean-Charles De Borda’s famous quote, our experiment indicates that positional voting rules make 
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subjects rather prone to behave “dishonestly”, shaping their elicited ranking to strategic considerations. As our 
results show, the textbook game-theoretic analysis of our game-forms is sufficient to explain much of subjects’ 
variability in behavior across treatments, at least once the usual amount of noise, typical of experimental data 
has been accounted for. We also report a non-linear size effect, also typical of other experimental environments 
(take Selten [8] or Huck et al. [9] for example), which surely calls for further investigation, so it is the case for 
the robustness of our results under different parametrizations and most crucial preference distributions. 
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Appendix A. Theory 
Two voters, A and B, vote on three candidates: (A, B, C) for a single seat. Each voter, simultaneously and inde-
pendently, allocates to each candidate a score from the set {1, α, 0}. We can represent a pure strategy by the 
triplet (a, b, c) where a is the score attributed to candidate A, b to candidate B and c to candidate C. There are six 
possible strategies: (1, α, 0), (α, 1, 0), (1, 0, α), (α, 0, 1) (0, α, 1), (0, 1, α) for positional voting whenever α ≠ 0, 1. 
For the plurality and the anti-plurality rules the set of strategies reduces to three: {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)} 
for the plurality rule and {(1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1)} for the anti-plurality rule, respectively. To determine the 
winner, the score of the candidates are added and the candidate with the largest score is the winner. In case of 
ties among the candidates with the largest score, a uniform random draw selects the identity of the winner. 
Player A prefers candidate A to candidate B and candidate B to candidate C and receives a payoff of 1 if can-
didate A is chosen, x if candidate B is elected and 0 if candidate C is chosen. Player B prefers candidate B to 
candidate A and candidate A to candidate C, with payoff 1 if B is chosen, x if A is chosen and 0 if C is chosen. In 
case of ties, i.e. when at least two candidates are chosen, the expected payoff is the average of the payoffs ob-
tained with the elected candidates (for instance if candidates A and B are chosen, the payoff is (1 + x)/2 for both 
players). Note that we assume 0 < x < 1. 
We say that a player votes sincerely if she allocates scores according to her preference profile: 1 to her pre-
ferred candidate, α to the second preferred candidate and 0 to the third preferred candidate. We say that a player 
votes strategically if she allocates 1 to her preferred candidate, α to the third preferred candidate and 0 to the 
second preferred candidate. Note that, in case of the plurality rule (α = 0), there is no difference between stra-
tegic and sincere voting. 
The value of α determines the winner and, therefore, the payoffs. In what follows, we shall apply as solution 
concept the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria which survive the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strate-
gies. Let us represent the payoff matrix when player A is the row player and player B is the column player. First, 
let us consider the extreme cases, whenever α = 0 or 1. 
 
Case 1. α = 0 (plurality rule).                                                     
 (0, 1, 0) sinc (1, 0, 0) (0, 0, 1) 
(1, 0, 0) sinc ((1 + x)/2, (1 + x)/2) (1, x) (1/2, x/2) 
(0, 1, 0) (x, 1) (1 + x)/2, (1 + x)/2) (x/2, 1/2) 
(0, 0, 1) (x/2, 1/2) or (1, x) (1/2, x/2) (0, 0) 
 
The sincere strategy dominates the other two strategies. The pair of strategies (sincere, sincere) constitutes an 
equilibrium in dominant strategies.  
 
Case 2. α = 0 (antiplurality rule).                                                  
 (1, 1, 0) sinc (0, 1, 1) strat (1, 0, 1) 
(1, 1, 0) sinc ((1 + x)/2, (1 + x)/2) (x, 1) (1, x) 
(1, 0, 1) strat (1, x) (0, 0) (1, x) 
(0, 1, 1) (x, 1), (x, 1) (0, 0) 
 
The strategy that consists of giving 0 to the most preferred candidate (the third strategy) is weakly dominated 
by sincere voting. If we eliminate this strategy for both player, the remaining game is an anti-coordination game 
with two asymmetric equilibria. To put it differently, in each pure strategy equilibrium of the reduced game that 
is obtained by the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies one player votes sincerely while the other 
votes strategically.  
 
Case 3. 0 < α < 1.                                                              
 (α, 1, 0) sinc (0, 1, α) strat (1, α, 0) (1, 0, α) (0, α, 1) (α, 0, 1) 
(1, α ,0) sinc ((1 + x)/2, (1 + x)/2) (x, 1) (1, x) (1, x) (s, t) (1, x) 
(1, 0, α) strat (1, x) (u, v) (1, x) (1, x) (0, 0) (1/2, x/2) 




(α, 1, 0) (x, 1) (x, 1) (1 + x)/2, (1 + x)/2) (1, x) (x, 1) (y, z) 
(0, 1, α) (x, 1), (x, 1) (x, 1) (u, v) (x/2, 1/2) (0, 0) 
(α, 0, 1) (y, z)) (0, 0) (1, x) (1/2, x/2) (0, 0) (0, 0 
(0, α, 1) (x, 1) (x/2, 1/2) (s, t) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
where (s, t), (y, z) and (u, v) depend on the parameter α as follows 
 
(s, t)= (1/2, x/2) if α < 1/2 (u, v)= ((1 + x)/2, (1 + x)/2) if α < 1/2 (y, z)= (x/2, 1/2) if α < 1/2 
 (1/3, 1/3) if α = 1/2  1 x 1 x,3 3
+ + 
 
   if α = 1/2  (1/3, 1/3) if α = 1/2 
 (x, 1) if α > 1/2  (0, 0) if α > 1/2  (1, x) if α > 1/2 
 
From the table it can be seen that the stategies that allocate a smaller score to the most preferred candidate 
than to the least preferred candidate are always weakly dominated by strategies reversing the scores for the most 
and least preferred candidates. That is, for player A strategy (0, α, 1) is weakly dominated by (1, α, 0), strategy 
(α, 0, 1) is weakly dominated by (1, 0, α), and strategy (0, 1, α) is weakly dominated by (α, 1, 0), strategy. The 
last three rows and the last three columns correspond to these weakly dominated strategies that can be eliminat-
ed in a first round. Once these strategies are eliminated the third row and the third columns become respectively 
weakly dominated by the sincere strategy. Eliminating this strategy we obtain the 2 × 2 game strategically cor-
responding to: 
 
 (α, 1, 0) sinc (0, 1, α) strat 
(1, α, 0) sinc ((1 + x)/2, (1 + x)/2) (x, 1) 
(1, 0, α) strat (1, x) (u, v) 
 
Whose equilibria are as follows: 
1) α < 1/2 : (strat, strat). 
2) α = 1/2: x ≤ 1/2 (strat, strat); x > 1/2, (strat, sinc) U (sinc, strat). 
3) α > 1/2: (strat, sinc) U (sinc, strat).  
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Appendix B. Experimental Instructions (Translated from Spanish) 
Welcome to the experiment! 
This experiment is intended to study how people behave when voting. 
We are only interested in average voting behavior, not in your particular voting behavior. Don’t think we ex-
pect you to vote in any particular way. 
But, on the other hand, the money you earn during the experiment depends on your vote. 
You will find instructions explaining how the experiment works and how to use the computer in the subse-
quent screens. 
Please, do not speak to your neighbors and keep quiet during the entire experiment. If you need help, please, 
raise your hand and wait in silence, we will come to your booth as soon as possible. 
How to Raise Money 
First of all, you will receive 1000 pesetas just for participating to the experiment. 
You will play 40 rounds of a voting protocol. In each round, you will be matched with other participants in 
this room, and each member of your matching group will have to cast a vote. How much you earn depends on 
your vote and on the votes of the other participants in your matching group. 
You could earn money in each round (vote). Your total profit for a given session will be the sum of your prof-
its in each round of the session. 
By the end of the experiment you will receive the sum of profits for each session, besides your show up fee of 
1000 pesetas. 
The Voting Protocol 
Three candidates, A, B and C, stand for an election. You and the rest of participants will be the electorate in this 
experiment. The computer has assigned you a letter, either A or B. This letter appears in the right corner of your 
screen and represents your player type. 
There are two types of players: player A and player B. 
Player A (her favorite candidate is A). 
If candidate A wins the voting round she gets 100 pesetas. If candidate B wins the voting round she gets x pe-
setas. If candidate C wins the voting round she gets 0 pesetas. 
Player B (her favorite candidate is B). 
If candidate B wins the voting round she gets 100 pesetas. If candidate A wins the voting round she gets x pe-
setas. If candidate C wins the voting round she gets 0 pesetas. 
Observe that when candidate C wins the voting round both players receive nothing.  
Important: you will have the same player type during all the experiment. 
The Voting Protocol (II) 
Remember that you and the rest of the people in your matching group will decide the result of the voting in each 
round. 
The number of people in each matching group will change in each of the T rounds. The number of people in 
each group will be two (2), four (4) or eight (8). We will let you know the size of your group at the beginning of 
each round. 
At the beginning of each round the computer randomly selects how many people will be in your group and 
who will be part of it. 
The number of players of each type will be the same in all groups at all times. If the group consists of two 
people, there will be 1 type A player and 1 type B player. If the group consists of four people, there will be 2 
type A player and 2 type B player. If the group consists of eight people, there will be 4 type A player and 4 type 
B player. 
The people to whom you are matched will change in each round but there will always be the same number of 
type A and type B players. 
Remember that your player type will not change during the experiment. 
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How to Vote 
You have to assign a score to each candidate. The scores you can assign to the candidates are the following: 1 
point, α points and 0 points. Thus, you will give 1 point to one of the candidates, α points to another candidate 
and 0 points to the third candidate. 
Voting Results 
The rest of people in your group will also vote by assigning scores to candidates. By the end of each vote 
(round), the computer will compute the total amount of points each candidate received. The candidate with the 
highest score is the winner of the election. In case of two or three candidates receiving the same amount of 
points there will be a tie. 
Your profit in each round depends on the winning candidate. 








The computer will randomly select your player type, either A or B. This will be your type during all the experi-
ment. 
You will vote T times (rounds). In each round, the computer will randomly selects the rest of your group 
members. The size of the group can be two, four or eight (including you). 
In each round you and your group mates will vote assigning scores to candidates A, B and C. Your votes and 
the votes of your group mates will determine your monetary profit. 
 

